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RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0324
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1537
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2803
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1952
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0309
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1339
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0882
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0826

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001079

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [ASEC](#) [CD](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: NRF REPS DECRY AU EVICTION DECISION

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Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)

11. (C) SUMMARY: The representatives for the Justice and Equality Movement/National Redemption Front, who are still in N'Djamena, have instructed their representatives in El Fasher that they should not leave the Cease Fire Commission unless the African Union provides a written statement requesting their departure. Once that happens, the NRF will issue a statement no longer accepting the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-Fire Agreement. While the NRF representatives expressed its condolences to the African Union for the deaths of two peacekeepers during the August 20 attack on a fuel convey, they were extremely concerned by the AU decision to coordinate investigation efforts with the Sudanese government, and argued that the GOS would use the opportunity to carry out its plan to wipe out all rebel groups who were non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement. END SUMMARY.

REPRESENTATIVES PONDERING NEXT MOVE

12. (C) JEM representatives Ahmed Tougod and Tahjadeine Niam met with Ambassador Wall on August 21 to discuss the recent African Union decision to expel representatives from the Justice and Equality Movement and the National Redemption Front from the Cease Fire Commission and the Joint Commission. Tougod stated that his plans to leave were currently delayed following the AU's decision, and he and members of the NRF hoped that the AU would review its decision. Niam added that the AU Ambassador in Chad, Mahmoud Kane, even expressed his surprise to Niam during a phone conversation following the AU's decision. Niam said that he was working with Kane and the African Union leadership to determine if the representatives from the CFC could be relocated to another area.

13. (C) The Ambassador noted the concerns that the United

States had with the AU's decision, and asserted that the AU's decision could heighten tensions in Darfur. Tougod and Niam agreed with this statement, and said that they were instructing their representatives to the CFC in El-Fasher to remain with the Commission until they received a formal letter from the AU requesting their departure. If and when such a letter was received, the JEM/NRF would ask its representatives to leave the CFC, and the movement would issue a statement announcing its pull-out from the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-Fire Agreement. He argued that without a presence in the CFC, the NRF could not bound to the cease-fire.

¶4. (C) Tougod said that the Chadians had already provided a formal request to the Sudanese rebels movements in N'Djamena to leave Chad, but they had not been as forceful as in past attempts in asking rebel representatives to leave the capital. Niam pointed out that there was still a contradiction in the Chadian decision to expel Sudanese rebel groups (part of the July 26 agreement) and the memorandum of understanding that was agreed to between the JEM and the GOC during the May 2005 negotiations in Abuja. He added that should the GOC press forward with their demand, Niam and Tougod would highlight the contradiction in the two Chadian agreements to the GOC authorities.

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CONDOLENCES FOR THE AU, CONCERN WITH THE GOS
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¶5. (C) Tougod and Niam stated that the NRF had already issued a statement condemning the August 19 attack on an AU fuel convoy, and expressing the movement's condolences for the deaths of two AU peacekeepers who were killed during the attack. However, they noted their extreme concern with the AU's decision to ask for Khartoum's assistance in tracking down the perpetrators. According to Niam, the AU could have

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asked the NRF to assist in locating the attackers (even if they were within the movement), or could have conducted an independent investigation without the support of either the GOS or NRF. The presence of Sudanese Armed Forces with African Union investigators meant that if the AU entered into territory controlled by the NRF, then the possibility of clashes between the SAF and NRF supporters was likely, putting all parties, including the AU, at risk.

¶6. (C) Tougod added that the GOS would use the opportunity to strike at NRF forces in the region. He pointed out the heavy military buildup by the SAF that was taking place in various points in Darfur, which, according to NRF sources within the SAF, was part of a plan to crush the NRF in the next 45 days to precede any U.N. decision on peacekeeping forces for Darfur. Tougod said that after eliminating the rebellion, the Sudanese would assert that a U.N. force was unnecessary, as there was no resistance to the DPA's implementation. He cited a number of troop and equipment buildups in Tine, Jebel Moon, and Kutum. According to Tougod, field commanders had indicated that 3,000 Sudanese troops, 90 Toyota landcruisers, and over 600 Janjaweed fighters were seen in the past day establishing positions 30 kilometers from El Fasher. Commanders loyal to Minni Minnawi were assisting these efforts. Niam and Tougod said that the NRF was prepared for any attacks by the SAF.

¶7. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.

WALL